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RECENT CASES
Administrative Law-Doctrine of Separation of Powers Is Not
Implied in New York City Charter-Acting under investigatory
powers granted by the city's charter ' the Council of New York City ap-
pointed a Committee, consisting of defendants, to investigate the conduct
of the Municipal Civil Service Commission. The Committee served upon
the Mayor a subpoena demanding production of an existing written report
made at the Mayor's direction.2 The Mayor seeks to quash the subpoena
asserting immunity from interference by the Council. Held, (two judges
dissenting) 3 motion denied. Doctrine of separation of powers is not im-
plied from the charter provision distributing powers between Mayor and
Council. LaGuardia v. Smith, 41 N. E. (2d) 153 (N. Y. 1942).
Although the Federal Constitution 4 imposes no requirement of sepa-
ration of powers upon the states,5 state constitutions either expressly or by
implication so provide.6 However, since cities lack sovereignty,' this
requirement has generally been interpreted to relate solely to the state gov-
ernment and not to municipal governments.8 Therefore, if the separation
of powers doctrine applies to a city government it is because it is implied
or expressed in its charter granted by the State Legislature. In the instant
case, the Majority, pointing out a number of non-executive functions
granted by the charter to the Mayor,9 assert that the city's charter does
i. By § 43 of the City's Charter the Council is granted "power from time to time
to appoint a special committee to investigate any matters relating to the property,
affairs or government of the city or of any county within the city. Any such commit-
tee shall have power to require the attendance and examine and take the testimony
under oath of such persons as it may deem necessary."
2. The Mayor had previously directed a city employee to investigate the personnel
at the Information Center and she had made a written report to him.
3. Mr. Chief Justice Lehman and Mr. Justice Rippey dissent.
4. The express vesting of the executive, legislative, and judicial powers in the
three branches of the federal government by the Constitution has always been inter-
preted to mean that each branch must exercise the powers vested in it, and cannot give
them away, nor encroach upon the powers confided to the others. Humphrey v. United
States, 295 U. S. 6o2 (1935) ; Donoghue v. United States, 289 U. S. 516 (933) ; Kil-
bourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168 (i88o).
5. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Seattle, 291 U. S. 3oo (934). "A state
may distribute its powers as it sees fit, provided only that it acts consistently and
does not transgress those restrictions of the Federal Constitution which are applicable
to State authority." Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 57 (932) ; Dreyer v. People of
State of Illinois, 187 U. S. 71 (19o2) ; Williams v. Eggleston, 17o U. S. 304 (1897).
6. "Some of our state constitutions expressly provide in one form or another that
the legislative, executive and judicial powers of the government shall be forever sepa-
rate and distinct from each other. Other constitutions, including that of the United
States, do not contain such an express provision. But it is implicit in all, as a con-
clusion logically following from the separation of the several departments." Springer
v. Philippine Islands, 277 U. S. 189, 201 (1927). Instant case at 155: "As to the pat-
tern of government adopted by the State of New York, it may be said that the design
includes by implication the separation of executive, legislative and judicial powers."
7. A city is but a political subdivision of the state exercising powers granted to it
by the state legislature. Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U. S. 304, 310 (I897), cited note 5
supra; Loeb v. City of Jacksonville, ioi Fla. 429, 134 So. 205 (193) ; Chicago Motor
Coach Co. v. City of Chicago, 337 IIl. 200, 169 N. E. 22 (1930) ; Richmond T. & P.
R. Co. v. City of Richmond, i45 Va. 225, 133 S. E. 8oo (1926).
8. State ex rel. Wilkinson v. Line, 181 Ala. 646, 658, 62 So. 31 (1913) ; Kaufman
v. City of Tallahassee, 84 Fla. 634, 639, 94 So. 697, 698 (1922) ; Sorlls v. State, ex rel.
Tremble, 201 Ind. 88, 115, 166 N. E. 270, 280 (1928) ; Eckerson v. City of Des Moines,
137 Iowa 452, 461-466, 115 N. W. 177, 181-190 (1908).
9. Instant case at 155: "Under charter provisions the Mayor, when sitting as a
member of the Board of Estimate, shares many executive responsibilities with the
Comptroller, the President of the Council and the Presidents of the five boroughs.
(14)
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not reveal an intent by the Legislature to keep the functions of Mayor and
Council absolutely independent. On the other hand, the Dissent, conced-
ing that the Legislature could have granted a charter without separation
of powers, contends that the intent to apply the doctrine should be implied
in New York City's charter from the distribution of powers between
Mayor and Council.10 A consideration of state and federal constitutions 1
reveals that the existence of separation of powers is not negatived by giv-
ing to one branch some functions logically allocable to another.' 2 Conse-
quently, it is difficult to see how the presence of the same factors in a city
charter can induce an opposite interpretation. Logically the same prac-
tical considerations ' 3 and established traditions which demanded the appli-
cation of separation of powers in federal government apply wherever
separate, distinct branches of government exist. While it might be con-
cluded that there has been no violation of separation of powers here and
therefore the result of the Majority is preferred on the facts, 14 certainly
there is much to be said for not adopting the broad conclusion that the
doctrine does not apply under the charter.
Constitutional Law--Constitutionality of Oklahoma's Habitual
Criminal Sterilization Act-Oklahoma ordered the sterilization of the
defendant under a statute ' providing for the sterilization of habitual crim-
inals, defined as persons thrice convicted of felonies involving moral turpi-
tude.2 Offenses arising out of violation of the prohibitory laws, revenue
acts, embezzlement, or political offenses were excluded from the Act. The
Ch. 3, §§ 6i, .62, 70. As a member of the Board of Estimate he is a member of the
Municipal Assembly (Laws 1924, c. 363, § io, amended Laws 1928, c. 671), and as
such may perform certain legislative functions (Charter, § 39). And although no pro-
vision is made for a judicial branch of the city's government, the charter contains the
anomalous provision that 'The mayor is a magistrate.' Id. § 6."
io. As it is pointed out in notes 4 and 6 supra, this is the manner in which it is
implied in state and federal constitutions.
II. The writer is unable to discover any cases in which the courts considered what
factors in city charters determined the existence or non-existence of the separation of
powers. The reasoning of the cases considering state and federal constitutions would
appear equally applicable to the problem with regard to city charters.
12. "The existence in the various constitutions of occasional provisions expressly
giving to one of the departments powers which by their nature otherwise would fall
within the general scope of the authority of another department emphasizes, rather
than casts doubt upon, the generally inviolate character of this basic rule." Springer
v. Philippine Islands, 277 U. S. i89, 2o2 (1927), cited note 6 supra. In the federal
government the President is given legislative power in so far as his assent is required
to the enactment of all statutes and resolutions of Congress. U. S. CoNsT., Art. I,
§ 7 (2). And the Senate is made to partake of executive power by the requirement of
its consent in ratification of treaties and appointment of officers. Id. at Art. II, § 2 (2).
The Senate also exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments, and the House of
preferring articles of impeachment. Id. at Art. I, §§ 2 (5), 3 (6).
13. In the interest of an efficient government it is.not -wise to allow one branch of
the government to intervene and impede the progress of another branch. As the dis-
sent in the instant case points out at p. i6o, a decision that the doctrine does not apply
to New York City Government will permit the Mayor and Council to interfere with
and discredit one another.
14. It may well be that even though the doctrine is held to apply to the New York
City Government, the subpoenaing of the executive officer by another branch of the
government would not be considered a violation of it. At the trial of Aaron Burr in
1807 in the Circuit Court before Justice Marshall, a subpoena was issued to President
Jefferson requiring him to produce certain papers Burr considered necessary to his
defense. For a discussion of that trial, see RABY, FFTy F&mous TRIALS (1937) 77.
I. OKLA. STAT. (935) C. 26, art. I; OKLA. STAT. AxN. (1940) c. 26, art. 2.
2. The enactment further provided for a jury trial limiting the issues to but two:
first, whether a given person is a "habitual criminal" and second, whether an operation
would be detrimental to general health.
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defendant had once been convicted of stealing chickens and twice convicted
of robbery. Held, the classification of crimes in the law is discriminatory
in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'
Skinner v. State ex rel Williamson, 62 Sup. Ct. IIIO (1942).
Sterilization laws have been held to be a denial of equal protection by
some courts because the laws only applied to inmates of institutions and
failed to include those degenerates outside.5  However, in Buck v. Bell,6
the Supreme Court held unqualifiedly that there is no discriminatory
classification in a provision of this type. Here that problem did not arise,
since the statute applied to all habitual criminals as defined, whether con-
fined in an institution or not. But the statute was held violative of equal
protection in view of the fact that under it those who have committed
offenses intrinsically of the same quality may be sterilized or not, depending
upon the formal classification of the crimes committed. The majority
opinion did not discuss-the more fundamental question of the validity as
such of habitual criminal sterilization statutes. Unless such a statute can
be sustained as a eugenic measure,7 it must be deemed a penal statute, and
as such might well be unconstitutional as imposing a cruel and unusual
punishment." It cannot be said that a statute directed at criminals as such
is eugenic in light of recent analyses showing that criminality as a trait is
not inheritable. 9 The real problems, avoided temporarily by the majority,
were recognized in the concurring opinions, especially by Justice Jackson,
who questioned the eugenic plan to eliminate racial characteristics only
vaguely identified and uncertain as to transmissibility and hinted limitation
3. Reversing 189 Okla. 235, 115 P. (2d) 123 (941), 2 BILL OF RIGHTS REV. 54;
(1942) 30 CALIF. L. Rzv. i89; (1941) 55 HARv. L. REV. 285.
4. Chief Justice Stone concurred on the ground that the statute violated the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the hearings provided were too
limited. Justice Jackson also concurred on the combined grounds of the majority and
Chief Justice Stone, disagreeing with each opinion insofar as it rejected or minimized
the grounds taken by the other.
5. Smith v. Board of Examiners, 85 N. J. L. 46, 88 At. 963 (Sup. Ct. 1913) ; In
re Thompson, 103 N. Y. Misc. 23, 169 N. Y. Supp. 638 (Sup. Ct. 1918); Haynes v.
Lapeer, 201 Mich. 138, 166 N. W. 938 (1918).
6. 274 U. S. 200 (1927). If a sterilization law affected all degenerates the difficulty
of enforcement would make it impracticable. The Virginia statute provided for indi-
vidual hearings to determine whether a person had definite and observable characteris-
tics which were transmissible.
7. The problem was directly considered by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in its
opinion in this case, and the court upheld the statute as passed for a eugenical purpose
and valid as such. Its conclusions are critically discussed in periodical comment. See
note 3 supra.
8. Courts have held that where the purpose of sterilization is purely punitive, it
inflicts cruel and unusual punishment. Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 Fed. 687 (D. C. Nev.
i9x8) ; Davis v. Berry, 216 Fed. 413 (S. D. Iowa 1914). Contra: State v. Feilen, 70
Wash. 65, 126 Pac. 75 (1912). But where the statute is eugenic in its purpose, it has
been held that there is no violation as it does not constitute a punishment. Board of
Eugenics v. Troutman, 5o Idaho 673, 299 Pac. 668 (193I) ; Davis v. Walton, 74 Utah
8o, 276 Pac. 921 (1929).
Assuming the Supreme Court were to hold the statute a penal one, the question
would then arise whether the statute is invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment, as
imposing a cruel and unusual punishment. The Court has not indicated its attitude on
the question. However, it would not be surprising if the Court were to uphold such a
statute on this point. Prior decisions establish that the Fourteenth Amendment does
not carry the provision of the Eighth Amendment against cruel and unusual punish-
ment through to the states. McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U. S. 155 (189I) ; In re Kemmler,
136 U. S. 436, 448 (i89o). And the Court has been reluctant to disturb the decisions
of the state courts on this question. Ibid.
9. See Montagu, The Biologist Looks at Crime (194) 217 ANNALS 46; Myerson,
Summary of Report of the American Neurological Association Committee for the In-
vestigation of Sterilization (1938) I Am. J. MED. JuR. 253; Richmond, Sterilization in
Wisconsin (935) 25 3. CliM. L. 586.
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to legislative power to experiment with criminals. However, this type of
statute need not be eliminated entirely, only corrected. It is true that the
importance of environmental conditions in criminality have been increas-
ingly demonstrated. Yet there is some basis for the proposition that care-
ful examination in individual criminal cases, upon the finding that such
individual is capable of producing offspring, can determine a probability
that the criminal's descendants will have proven anti-social tendencies. 0
If the statute contained a satisfactory classification and individual hearings,
it would seem to satisfy the more enlightened view, for then sterilization
would be not directed against criminals as a class, but against individuals.11
Constitutional Law-Pennsylvania Parole Act Held Unconstitu-
tional as Violating Governor's Power of Pardon and Parole-After
serving minimum sentence, prisoner was ordered released by court; Parole
Board then ordered his detention for six months lpnger. Prisoner brought
a writ of habeas corpus for his release. Held, Order of Parole Board
invalid; State Parole Act,' unconstitutional as violating the governor's
power to commute sentences and the judicial power vested exclusively in
the court system. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ex rel. Banks v. Cain,
Pa. C. P. 32d Dist., June Term, 1942.
The power of legislatures to invest pardon and parole authority in
administrative bodies alone depends often on the provisions of the respec-
tive state constitutions.2 Where such power is not given any branch of
government expressly, it has been generally held that the legislature may
enact such rules as it sees fit; ' that the pardon and parole power is not
inherent nor exclusive in the governor. When, as is the usual situation,
the constitution expressly gives such powers to the governor, the results
have been confused and varied; some states permit the grant to a parole
board, others call the power "exclusive" in the governor., The applicable
article 5 of the Pennsylvania Constitution gives the governor power to
grant reprieves, commutations of sentence and pardons on recommendation
in writing of the Lieutenant-Governor, Secretary of the Commonwealth,
Attorney General, Secretary of Internal Affairs or any three of them. The
court in the instant case held that this constitutional delegation precluded
the legislature from investing a parole board with the power to commute
sentences, because that would encroach on the governor's exclusive power,
io. See Shartel, Sterilization of Mental Defectives (I9z5) 24 Mica. L. REv. I, 4-5.
II. FINK, CAUSES OF CRIME (1938) 210; Boston, A Protest Against Laws Au-
thorizing the Sterilization of Criminals and Imbeciles (1913) 4 J. CRim. L. 326; Land-
man, The Hunan Sterilization Movement (1933) 24 J. Clum. L. 400; Richmond, note
IO supra. Compare the provisions of the statute considered in Opinion of Justices, 230
Ala. 543, 162 So. 123 (1935).
I. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1941) tit. 61, § 331.1.
2. See Jamison v. Flanner, m16 Kan. 624, 228 Pac. 82 (1924), wherein is a review
of constitutional provisions of the various states in respect to the pardoning and parole
power of the governor.
3. See Ex parte Miers, 124 Tex. Cr. R. 592, 64 S. W. (2d) 778, 780 (1933) : "The
pardoning power is inherent in sovereignty, and may be lodged wherever the people
determine. However, if once it has been conferred by the Constitution, it cannot be
exercised by the Legislature". Accord, Moore v. City of Newport, 198 Ky. I18, 248
S. W. 837 (1923).
4. Jamison v. Flanner, 116 Kan. 624, 228 Pac. 82 (924), reviews the devolution
and principles of the pardoning and parole power with respect to the various state
constitutions, and shows how some states permit a delegation of the power to a special
board, while others do not. Cases both in accord and contra to the holding in the in-
stant case are cited therein in a quite complete and adequate review of the law on par-
don and parole. See also the various state constitutions.
5. PA. CoNsT. Art IV, § 9.
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and further because it would encroach on the powers vested in the judi-
ciary.6 In answer to the argument proposed that the governor's power
was not infringed because he had the right to appoint the members of the
Parole Board, and, therefore, their acts might be considered his, the court
says, 7 first, that "the power of pardon and commutation is personal to him
(the governor) and cannot be delegated", and, second, "that the Gov-
ernor's power of pardon and commutation is not absolute but can only be
exercised on written recommendation of three members of the Pardon
Board,8 so that, even if he could delegate his own power, he has no au-
thority to waive the constitutional rights of the Pardon Board." The
majority of the jurisdictions wherein a similar problem has arisen are in
accord with the decision in the instant caseY Further, the Constitutional
requirement of recommendation by three members of the Pardon Board
further strengthens the decision here. However, it is submitted that a con-
trary result would be to the best interests of the general public, since it
has been dearly demonstrated 10 in states where Boards have exclusive
control over parol problems that such a method is both efficient and
advantageous.1
Counties-Taxpayer's Action to Recover All Monies Expended
on an Illegal Contract Where County Retained Its Benefits-Tax-
payer's action on behalf of county against contractor and county com-
missioners to recover monies illegally spent by the commissioners on a
contract to repair county buildings,' claiming that the contract was void
for non-compliance with the statutory requirement of advertising for com-
petitive bids.2  Held, the contract is absolutely void as being in excess
of the agency's power,8 the contractor acts at his peril, and payments made
to him for work are illegal and may be recovered even if such rule works
6. PA. CONST. Art. V, § i.
7. Instant case, unpublished opinion, at ii.
8. The "Pardon Board" consisting of those state officers designated by the Con-
stitution to recommend pardons or reprieves to the governor.
9. See footnote 4 supra.
1o. Abbott, California Parole System (1936) 2 ORE. S. B. B. 93; Cass, Parole
Can Be Successful (Five Year Study-New York) (1940) 31 J. CRI. L. & CRiMINOL.
7; Dickinson and Colson, Probation and Parole (1937) 44 W. VA. L. Q. o5; Har-
vey, Recommendations for Legislative Reform in Prison, Parole and Probation (1936)
27 J. Cm. L. & CRIMINOL. 539; Lane, Parole Procedure in New Jersey (1931) 22
J. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOL. 375; Raymond, Purpose and Operation of Parole (1939) 13
FLA. L. J. 133.
ii. The court in the instant case reviews the history of parole legislation in Penn-
sylvania, pointing out that former so-called "delegations" to boards were valid only
when they limited the governor's powers, but not when they completely abrogated
those powers. See also Kolakoski and Broecker, Pennsylvania Parole System in
Operation (1932) 23 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL. 427. The court in the instant case em-
phasizes the entrenchment on the governor's pardoning powers, failing to stress the
interference with the judicial powers, seemingly relevant, especially in the light of pre-
viously decided Pennsylvania cases emphasizing or being decided solely on this judicial
angle. See Commonwealth ex rel. Johnson v. Halloway, 42 Pa. 446 (1862); see also
People v. Cummings, 88 Mich. 249, 50 N. W. 310 (891).
i. The county owned certain real property upon which were situated certain struc-
tures and a rock quarry with its complement of machinery and appliances. The con-
tract was made to repair these items.
2. POL. CODE OF CAL. (Deering, 1937) § 4041.18 (gave the board of supervisors in
their respective counties jurisdiction over buildings and provided that when the repairs
to the same exceed five hundred dollars the board should advertise for bids).
3. The court stated that compliance with the terms of a statute requiring com-
petitive bidding is mandatory and a contract made without compliance with the statute
is void and unenforceable as being in excess of the agency's power. Instant case at 37.
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hardship on the contractor and the public agency has received benefit.
Miller v. McKinnon, et al., 124 P. (2d) 34 (Cal. 1942).
As a general rule contracts wholly beyond the powers of a munici-
pality are void,4 but where a contract is within the general powers and
is invalid for some mere irregularity an implied liability is imposed.5 Where
the mode and manner of contracting is limited by statute, some courts hold
any contract in disregard of the statute void and do not permit any recov-
ery for the reasonable value of the benefit to the public agency;6 other
courts adopt a more equitable policy and permit the contractor to recover
this reasonable value.7  The instant case is based on the first view, and
reasons that if the contractor cannot recover the reasonable value of the
work he has performed, it follows that any payments made to him can be
recovered.8 It is interesting to note that the above two positions have
been influenced by two decisions 9 which were decided in the same juris-
diction as the instant case.'0 The first view is based on the theory that
a political body should be kept strictly within its delegated powers and
considers it the legislative intent that these limitations are mandatory; the
second view is that the legislative intention, unless there is a clear man-
date to the contrary," assumes that the municipal corporation is liable to
the same extent as private corporations.' 2  The application of the first
4. Fancher et al. v. Grant County, 28 N. M. 179, 2IO Pac. 237 (1922) (where a
contract is ultra vires and void no recovery on a quantum meruit may be had although
a benefit accrues to the county) ; accord, Los Angeles Dredging Co. v. Long Beach,
210 Cal. 348, 291 Pac. 839 (1930) ; Jackson v. Board of Education, 112 Minn. 167, 127
N. W. 569 (191o).
i 5. Shaddock v. Schwartz, 246 N. Y. 288, I58 N. E. 872 (1927) (bid submitted
in gross and not in items as required) ; Vito v. Simsbury, 87 Conn. 261, 87 At. 722
(1913); Watkins v. School District, 85 Kan. 76o, II8 Pac. io69 (Ig1). Contra:
Gugenheim v. Marion, 242 Ky. 350, 46 S. W. (2d) 478 (1932).
6. Kelly v. Torrington, 8o Conn. 378, 68 Yktl. 855 (i9o8) (failure to comply with
statutes as to competitive bidding); Detroit v. Michigan Paving Co., 36 Mich. 335
(1877) (contract not let to lowest bidder as required by statute) ; Parr v. Greenbush,
72 N. Y. 463 (1878) (violation of statute that contract be let to lowest bidder after
advertising).
7. In Green v. Okanogan County, 6o Wash. 309, 111 Pac. 226 (igio), a contract
for the building of a bridge was let without calling for competitive bids. The court held
that the contract was void but said that they had adopted a more equitable doctrine of
allowing the parties, where the contract if entered into in conformity with the statutes
would not have been unlawful, to retain from the moneys received by them a sum
equivalent to the reasonable value of the property the county acquires and retains.
Accord, Fargo Foundry Co. v. Village of Callaway, 148 Minn. 273, 18I N. W. 584
(1921) (contract not let on competitive bids as required) ; O'Neill v. South Omaha,
IO2 Neb. 836, 17o N. W. 174 (I918) (contract invalid because statute requiring com-
petitive bidding was violated but a recovery on an implied contract was allowed).
8. Instant case at 38.
9. Tooke, Quasi-Contractual Liability of Municipal Corporations (1934) 47
HARv. L. REv. 1143, 1158.
1O. In Agenti v. San Francisco, 16 Cal. 255 (i86o), a dictum was written by
Justice Cope in which he stated that the statutory directions as to the methods of con-
tracting were to be liberally construed. He later repudiated this position in Zottman
v. San Francisco, 20 Cal. 96 (z862). However, the principle announced in the dictum
in the Argenti case is still followed in other jurisdictions.
ii. Ohio has a statute specifically stating 'the situation in which a contractor may
recover for work and material. OHIO CODE ANN. (Throckmorton, 1940) § 4223, in
requiring that contracts be written and signed, states, "No contractor shall be allowed
to recover anything for work or material caused by any alteration or modification,
unless such contract is made in such manner". In CAL. GEN. LAw (Deering, 1931)
Art. 5233, § 102, is a similar provision in regard to Municipal Corporations, but the
court in the instant case did not mention it in declaring a contract void as respects a
county.
12. TooKE, supra note 9, at II61.
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view works great hardship on the contractor 1 and the tendency in sev-
eral states is to get away from its strictness and to adopt a more liberal
attitude whenever possible.14 This course would seem desirable, and as
long as the purpose of the statute 15 is not defeated 16 the contractor should
be permitted to recover a reasonable value.1
7
Courts-The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins as Applied
to the Rule Exempting Litigants from Service of Summons-
Defendant, a citizen of Illinois, also defendant in another suit pending in
the Federal District Court of Missouri, came into Missouri to attend that
trial and was there served with the writ in the instant case. Defendant
moves to dismiss on the ground that exemption from service is granted
litigants who enter a jurisdiction solely for the purpose of attending trial.
Held, motion to dismiss sustained, on the ground that the exemption is
not substantive law but a mere "rule of practice" and therefore the doc-
trine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins ' does not apply. Hardie v. Bryson,
44 F. Supp. 67 (E. D. Mo., 1942).
The weight of authority exempts from service of summons those who
enter the jurisdiction as litigants in another judicial action.2 Missouri,
however, refuses to grant such immunity.3 Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,
ruled that the Federal Court is required to follow the law of the state
where it sits. Subsequent decisions have limited this requirement to sub-
stantive law.4 The court in the instant case classified the exemption as
x3. Instant case at 38. The court, quoting Zottman v. San Francisco, 20 Cal. 96
(1862), cited note IO supra, says: 'It may sometimes seem a hardship on the con-
tractor that all compensation for work done, etc, should be denied him; . .. but he
-is bound to see the charter is complied with. . . . If the statute forbids the contract
he has made, he knows it, or ought to know it, before he places his money or services
at hazard' ".
14. (1938) 36 MicH. L. REv. 85s, 859 (the trend from the strict to the lenient
approach is traced); Potts v. Utica, 86 F. (2d) 616 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936) (require-
ments of competitive bidding are held generally not to apply to contracts for personal
service of a technical nature) ; North River Elec. L. & P. Co. v. City of New York,
48 App. Div. 14, 62 N. Y. Supp. 726 (I9OO) (contracts entered into under an emergency
excepted).
15. 3 McQUILLIx, MUicinAL CooRATIoNs (2d ed. 1928) § 1286. "Such re-
quirements are for the purpose of inviting competition, to guard against favoritism,
improvidence, extravagance, fraud and corruption in awarding municipal contracts,
and to secure the best work or supplies at the lowest price practicable, and are enacted
for the benefit of property holders and taxpayers . . . and should be so construed
and administered as to accomplish such purpose fairly and reasonably with sole refer-
ence to public interest."
16. Would the purpose of the statute be defeated if the contractor received reason-
able compensation, if such compensation were kept low enough to prevent a recurrence
of this type of conduct?
17. The meaning of reasonable value should be interpreted in the light of the view
taken in note 16 supra.
1. 304 U. S. 64, 78 (1938), 86 U. oF PA. L. REv. 896. "Except in matters gov-
erned by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any
case is the law of the state. And whether the law of the state shall be declared by its
legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal
concern. There is no federal general common law." Notes (941) 9 U. CHi. L. REv.
113, 308, (1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 1472.
2. Long v. Ansell, 293 U. S. 76 (934) ; Note (1933) 85 A. L. R. 1340, 1341, and
authorities noted therein; BowERs, PROCESS AND SEIVCE (1927) § 370.
3. Baisley v. Baisley, 113 Mo. 544, 21 S. W. 29 (1893) ; Christian v. Williams, iii
Mo. 429, 2o S. W. 96 (1892) ; see Mertens v. McMahon, 334 Mo. 175, 66 S. W. (2d)
127 (1933).
4. Stephenson v. Grand Trunk Ry., ilo F. (2d) 402 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940), cerf.
dismissed, 311 U. S. 720 (1940) ; Notes (1941) 9 U. CHi. L. REv. 113, 308, (1938)
38 CoL. L. REv. 1472.
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a "rule of practice", basing such finding on general discussion of the exemp-
tion rule and the policy behind it. The distinction between "substantive"
and "procedural" has occasioned more difficulty than any other issue in
applying the Erie doctrine. Several tests have been formulated, but no
one to fit all situations. Among them are one which holds the matter
"substantive" if an application of the federal rule would result differently
from an application of the state rule; - another which says "substantive"
denotes the rules that determine legal relations when all the facts have
been made known to the court and "procedure" concerns the process by
which the facts are made known.6 Under the first-mentioned test the
exemption is clearly substantive for it would change the result to apply
the federal rule, while under the second the rule is one of procedure. But
the basic reason for the Erie case is that mere choice of court should not
be important in the settling of disputes,7 and this case seems to necessitate
an application of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins on that basis. This attempt
to disregard the Missouri rule, and yet square the case with the Erie doc-
trine was occasioned by the court's desire to uphold the policy behind the
exemption rule.8 Admitting that the general rule regarding exemption
from service is to the best interests of justice,9 and that Missouri would
do well to follow the majority and change its law, it is not within the
province of the Federal Court to change it; Erie Railroad v. Tompkins
decided just that.
Estoppel by Deed-After-Acquired Title Inures to Benefit of
Purchase-Money Mortgagee-The owner of a 99-year lease which had
13 years to run conveyed the land to the plaintiff who executed a deed of
trust on the land to secure the purchase price. Having failed to receive
payment by the expiration of the original lease the mortgagee subsequently
foreclosed upon an after-acquired lease of the mortgagor to the same land.
Held (2 judges dissenting), that the new lease inured to the benefit of
the trust deed and was covered thereby.' Jackson v. Holt, 6 So. (2d)
915 (Miss. 1942).
S. Note (1941) 9 U. Cmi. L. REv. 113, 119: "If, assuming that counsel properly
apply the federal rule, the result of the litigation is likely to be the same as that which
would be reached by the application of the state rule, then the matter should be consid-
ered procedural, and the federal rule applied. If . . . even though counsel properly
apply the federal rule, the federal court will probably reach a result different from that
which would be reached by application of the state rule, the matter should be consid-
ered substantive."
6. Note (1938) 38 COL. L. REV. 1472, 1484; Note (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 308, 310.
7. Note (1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 1472, 1484: "It is impossible to set out in detail
the criteria which should control the settlement of 'substance'-'procedure' problems in
all cases. The basic idea is clear: mere choice of court should not be important in the
settling of disputes." Fox, State Substantive Law in the Federal Courts (1940) 14
FLA. L. J. 97. Authorities indicate the Supreme Court will refuse to tolerate any
wholesale endeavors by lower Federal Courts to minimize the full effect of the Erie
case by simply denominating an issue as "procedural". Thus, a consideration of the
policies involved in the Erie case manifests an intention that it be applied if possible
rather than that attempts be made to distinguish it by mere classification of rights as
procedural, thereby avoiding its application.
8. See instant case at 71 and authorities cited therein.
9. See footnote 8 supra.
z. For a discussion of the two theories of estoppel by deed, see PEILaRlcK, PaoP-
ErrY (939) 443, where of the first he explains, "One was a personal rebutter
which prevented the warrantor . . . from setting up an after-acquired title against
those to whom he had earlier purported to convey it with warranty. But this was not
a conveyance. . . ." And of the second [title by estoppel], "The new title was put
into the grantee regardless of intervening claims of bona fide purchasers, . . . the title
passing instantly from the grantor. . . . In some states a court of equity forces it upon
him. . . " (Italics in the original.)
While it is well settled that the doctrine of estoppel by deed applies
where the grantor subsequently acquires the title which his deed purported
to convey to the grantee,2 and that this rule also applies to mortgages,2
it is generally recognized that this rule is inapplicable to purchase-money
mortgages.4  It was stated in a leading case, Randall v. Lower,5 that"equity does not require that a'grantee should mortgage back a greater
estate than that his grantor professed to vest in him, nor can it be implied
that a grantee, in mortgaging back the land for the purchase money, in-
tended to grant an estate which the deed assumed to grant but which it
did not vest in him." 6 Generally, in order that an after-acquired estate
might pass by estoppel it is necessary that the deed contain covenants or
warranties of title,7 but if it purports to pass a particular named estate,
the effect of a covenant is obtained." The question of estoppel could not
therefore properly arise in the instant case, in the absence of covenants
in the trust deed, unless there was some connection between the new and
the old lease,9 and the construction of the words "grant, bargain and sell" 10
in the mortgage to indicate the intention to convey an interest greater than
that received seems unwarranted by the facts." The doctrine of estoppel
by deed should be restricted in its application to those factual situations
where the grantor or mortgagor attempts to convey an interest which he
does not possess.12 While a mortgage contains a promise enforceable upon
2. Donalson v. Yeates, 173 Ga. 3o, i59 S. E. 856 (1931); Myers v. American
Oil Co, 5 So. (2d) 218 (Miss. i94i); Turick v. Erdman, 112 N. J. Eq. 261, 164 AUt.
40 (933).
J. First Nat. Bank of Lincoln v. Cash, 22o Ala. 319, 125 So. 28 (1930) ; Stone v.
Morris, 177 Ark. 745, 7 S. W. (2d) 796 (1928) ; Hamlin v. Hawkins, 332 Mo. io98,
6x S. W. (2d) 348 (933) ; Merchants Nat. Bank of Fargo v. Miller, 52 N. D. 273, 229
N. W. 357 (930).
4. Nelson v. Dwiggins, iii Fla. 298, 149 So. 613 (i933); Florida Land Co. v.
Williams, 98 Fla. 1258, 116 So. 642 (1928). See 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed.
1939) § 2233, where the author states, "In the case of a purchase-money mortgage, the
mortgage is properly to be construed as purporting to convey or charge such interest
only as the mortgagor acquired by the conveyance from the mortgagee, and conse-
quently . .. the mortgagee cannot claim the benefit of a title subsequently acquired
by the mortgagor."
5. 98 Ind. 255 (1884).
6. Id. at 26o.
7. RAWLE, COVENANTS FOR TImE (5th ed. 1887) § 247.
8. Van Rensselaer v. Kearney, ii How. 297 (U. S. 185o).
q. Justice Holmes, in Ayer v. Phila. & Boston Face Brick Co, 159 Mass. 84, 34
N. E. 177 (893), states, "The existence of the estoppel does not rest on the prevention
of fraud, or on the fact of a representation actually believed to be true. It is the tech-
nical effect of a technical representation, the extent of which is determined by the
scope of the words devoted to making it." In the absence of an estoppel in pais, or of
an express covenant in the deed, it would seem that only by a process of accretion, as
for example, the presence of a renewal clause in the lease to the mortgagee, Jackson,
the new lease inuring to the benefit of the old one as one of the powers conveyed to
the mortgagor and pledged by him as security, could the mortgage be extended to
cover the new lease.
IO. Justice Alexander, dissenting at 917 of the instant case, states, "This particu-
lar deed of trust warranted the title to certain personalty therein, but the mortgagor
undertook only to 'grant, bargain and sell' the land. This is not sufficient to constitute a
warranty." On this point, see Cunningham v. Dillard, 71 Miss. 61, 13 So. 882 (i893);
I MISS. CODE (1930) § 2126.
II. In the instant case at 917 Justice Alexander explains, "The bill (by the mort-
gagor) alleged without answer, and the proof showed that both parties well understood
that the interest conveyed by the deed to Holt and his purchase-money deed of trust
back to Jackson conveyed only the unexpired portion of the 99-year lease."
12. The crux of the case hinges on whether or not the language of the deed of
trust can be construed to be a conveyance of something more than the mere unexpired
term of the lease. The majority emphasized that in the absence of restrictions in the
mortgage it should be construed to mean a conveyance in fee simple, but the better
interpretation would seem to be that of Justice Alexander (see note ii supra) that no
RECENT CASES
the personal assets of the mortgagor, and conceivably the new lease could
be levied upon and sold in execution of the debt, to relate the new interest
by estoppel to the mortgage itself, merely because the same land is the
subject of both interests, is untenable, either in logic or justice. To impute
by estoppel to the mortgagee a totally new and unrelated interest of the
mortgagor is to stretch beyond reason a doctrine whose just and practical
application is best employed under other circumstances.
Evidence-Competency of Wife as a Witness Against Husband
in Incest Case-Defendant was convicted for incest with his daughter.
Principal witness against defendant was his wife.1  Statute prohibited one
spouse from testifying against the other "except in a criminal proceeding
for a crime committed by the one against the other . . ." 2 Held (two
judges dissenting), incest is not such a "crime against wife" as to make
the wife a competent witness against the husband within the statute. Toth
v. State, 3 N. W. (2d) 899 (Neb. 1942).
Although there is a split of authority concerning the competency of
one spouse as a witness against the other,' the majority of states have
adopted statutes similar to the one in the instant case. However, even
these jurisdictions differ in their interpretation of the statute, some con-
struing it literally to conform with the common law rule, which prohibited
the wife from testifying against her husband except where personal vio-
lence had been committed upon her,4 and others including in "crimes
against the spouse" not only personal violence but sexual offenses with or
against third persons., Nebraska has heretofore adopted the liberal view,
permitting spouse's testimony in cases involving offenses against the mari-
tal relation such as adultery,8 bigamy,7 and statutory rape,8 and stating that
the rule would likewise extend to incest.9 In the instant case the court has
retracted its earlier position, not by overruling its liberal construction of the
statute, but by attempting to distinguish incest from adultery as a crime
against the spouse.10 The crime committed in the instant case by a married
man was adultery in its most vicious form. Because of the very nature of
the act and the statute requiring corroboration of prosecutrix's testimony,
interest was granted beyond that received by Holt in the conveyance from the mort-
gagee, Jackson, and that, therefore, no estoppel could arise.
x. Court ruled that "in a prosecution for incest, the evidence of the prosecutrix
need not necessarily be corroborated by an eyewitness to the particular act, bt~t it is
necessary that she be corroborated as to the material facts and circumstances which
tend to support her testimony."
2. NEB. CaMP. STAT. (1929) C. 20, art. 12, § 3.
3. One or two states, including Georgia and Illinois, still cling to the antiquated
rule prohibiting one spouse from testifying against the other. 2 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE
(3d ed. 1940) § 603. A second minority, led by Kansas, holds that a spouse is not in-
competent but merely privileged not to testify against the other in a criminal action.
Buzick, Competency of the Spouse as a Witness (i94i) 9 J. B. A. KAN. 28r.
4. (i919) 4 A. L. IL io6g.
5. Cases cited (i919) 4 A. L. 1?. 1070.
6. Lord v. State, 17 Neb. 526, 23 N. W. 5o7 (1885).
7. Hills v. State, 6i Neb. 589, 85 N. W. 836 (igoi).
8. See Harris v. State, 8o Neb. 195, 199, 114 N. W. 168, 170 (1907) (complaint
for statutory rape of step-daughter was signed by defendant's wife).
9. Owens v. State, 32 Neb. i67, 49 N. W. 226 (i8gi). This was an incest case
in which defendant was acquitted for lack of evidence. Although the wife did not
testify, in its opinion the court said, "It was prosecutor's privilege to have called de-
fendant's wife as a witness . . . a wife may be called by the state to testify against
her husband on an indictment for adultery . . . and if for adultery, the more swiftly
might she be called on an indictment for incest." Accord, State v. Chambers, 87 Iowa
I, 53 N. W. Iogo (893).
1o. Instant case at 9o3.
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the only testimony available was furnished by the wife and mother. The ma-
jority admits its lack of 'sympathy with its holding but concludes that it
must follow the dictates of the legislature. The statute concerning testimony
of a spouse does not specifically limit its admissibility to cases of personal
violence, adultery, or bigamy, but to those crimes committed by one against
the other. The court had interpreted adultery to be such a crime within
the statute. 1 If the legislature intended the sexual offense of the husband
committed with a strange woman to be a crime against the wife, then it
certainly intended the same offense committed with the wife's own daughter
to be a crime against her.1 2  Having adopted the construction of the
statute including crimes against the marriage relation, and in failing to
repudiate that general position, the instant decision appears clearly unten-
able in its distinction between adultery and incest.
Habeas Corpus-Determination of Relevancy of Questions for
Refusal to Answer which Witness was Committed for Contempt by
Foreign Commissioner-Witness was committed by commissioner
appointed by foreign court for contempt in refusing on grounds of irrel-
evancy to answer questions during taking of deposition. In habeas corpus
proceeding court refused to determine question of irrelevancy and re-
manded the witness. Held, (2 judges dissenting) judgment reversed.
To deny witness a hearing in habeas corpus proceeding on the competency
and relevancy of the questions asked is a denial of remedy by due course
of law. Ex parte Martin, 41 N. E. (2d) 702 (Ohio 1942).
Statutes have been enacted in virtually all the states authorizing the
taking of depositions by designated officers for use in foreign trials.1 But
in the powers granted these officers to compel answers on examination the
statutes are divergent: one type requires the officer to petition the court
to compel the witness' answer; 2 the other type 8 gives the officer power
directly to commit the witness for contempt for noncompliance with his
order.' The instant decision was rendered under a statute of the latter
ii. Lord v. State, 17 Neb. 526, 23 N. W. 5o7 (I885), cited note 5 supra.
12. "By a liberal view, any injury to a spouse's child is a wrong to the spouse and
his or her testimony becomes admissible against the other." 8 WIGMORE, EViDENCE
(3d ed. 1940) § 2239. Hunter v. State, io Okla. Crim. Rep. i19, 134 Pac. 1134 (1913)
(Husband was indicted for having failed to furnish his child with necessary food and
clothing. Wife was held to be a competent witness, a crime against the child being a
crime against the mother of the child). This view would make the wife in the instant
case doubly qualified as a competent witness against the husband.
I. For a collection of foreign deposition statutes see 8 WIGmoRE, EvIDENCE (3d
ed. 1940) §2195 (d), n. I. For general statutory provisions on depositions see RAG-
LAND, DiscovFRY BEFORE TRIAL (2932) 251.
2. A typical statute is ILL. ANN. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1934) c. 5I, § 36. RAGLAND,
DIsCOVERY BEroRE Tx.AL (1932) 97.
3. Id. at 1O4. In England a commissioner has no power to pass on an objection
to the relevancy of a question. HumE-Wn.LAMS AND MACKLIN, THE TAKING OF
EVIDENCE ON CommIssION (1895) 125. Mr. Wigmore has criticized the delegation of
this judicial power to inferior and quasi-judicial officers as impolitic and constitu-
tionally illogical. See 8 WIGmoaR, EVInENcE (3d ed. 1940) § 2195 (1). Compare dis-
cussion of this power in People ex rel. MacDonald v. Leubischer, 34 App. Div. 577, 54
N. Y. Supp. 870 (ist Dep't 1898) (this court declared a statute similar to Ohio's un-
constitutional) ; see Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brinson, 154 U. S. 447, 485
(1894). But see Ex parte Bevan, 126 Ohio St. 126, 133, 184 N. E. 393, 397 (1933).
4. Foreign commissioner can commit witness for contempt in refusing to be sworn.
Benckenstein v. Schott, 92 Ohio St. 29, 11o N. E. 633 (1915). Foreign commissioner
cannot compel production of records by subpwna duces tecum. Ex parte Dillon, 225
Mo. App. 280, 29 S. W. (2d) 236 (1930).
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type; 5 in states with similar statutes there is no authority on the precise
question here involved. Refusal of a witness to answer questions imper-
tinent to the issues on trial is not a contempt; 6 therefore the majority
properly held that the relevancy of the questions was the gist of the habeas
corpus inquiry.7 Where the main trial and habeas corpus proceeding are
in the same jurisdiction, it has been decided that the question of relevancy
is for the court in which the principal trial is being held and the witness
cannot be discharged on a writ of habeas corpus.' But in later cases the
rule is established that on habeas corpus proceeding the relevancy of the
evidence may be questioned.' Where the principal trial is in a foreign
court the domestic court will discharge the witness if the evidence sought
is clearly incompetent.10 A broad test of competency is usually applied: 1
it is sufficient if the evidence may be competent, "and not entirely irrele-
vant to the subject-matter of the action." 12 It is submitted that this rule
does not trench on the recognized principle of Conflict of Laws that the
law of the forum determines the admissibility of evidence; '" for the courts
generally permit a wide latitude in the scope of the examination. To de-
prive the commissioner of the power to compel testimony by commitment
for contempt would defeat the purpose of the foreign deposition statute.
14
And to postpone determination of the lawfulness of the witness' refusal to
testify would deny him protection of the writ of habeas corpus.15 It is
believed that the instant decision assures the benefits of the deposition stat-
ute while preserving the efficacy of habeas corpus proceedings.
5. "Disobedience of a subpoena, a refusal to be sworn, except upon failure to pay
fees duly demanded, and an unlawful refusal to answer as a witness or to subscribe a
deposition, may be punished as a contempt of the court or officer by whom the attend-
ance is required." OHIO CODE ANN. (Throckmorton, i94o) § 11510.
6. Ex parte Zeehandelaar, 7I Cal. 238, 12 Pac. 259 (i886). Witness' or coun-
sel's opinion as to the relevancy of required testimony is immaterial. See Fairfield
et al. v. United States, 146 Fed. 508, 509 (i9O6) ; Finn v. Winneschick Dist. Court,
145 Iowa 157, 123 N. W. io66, io69 (I9O9). RAPALJE, CONTEMPT (1887) § 66.
7. Instant case at 705.
8. Ex parte McKee, 18 Mo. 599 (1853) ; De Camp v. Archibald, 50 Ohio St. 618,
35 N. E. 1056 (0893) (In this case the court found as a fact that the evidence sought
was competent).
9- Bennett v. Strodtman, 42 S. W. (2d) 43 (Mo. 1931) ; Ex parte Schoepf, 74
Ohio St. 1, 77 N. E. 276 (igo6) ; Ex parte Jennings, 6o Ohio St. 319, 54 N. E. 262
(i899) ; CHURCH, HABEAS CORPUS (2d ed. 1893) § 319.
io. In re Beardsley, 37 Kan. 666, i6 Pac. 153 (I887).
ii. The dissenting opinion in the instant case at 708 distinguishes between the
cases involving foreign trials and the cases involving domestic trials, implying that the
domestic court has no criterion by which to determine the competency of evidence for
foreign trials. But this contention is met by the majority at 707, where it points out
that evidence which falls within the limits of the instructions accompanying the com-
mission is competent for the purpose of habeas corpus proceedings.
12. Matter of Randall, 90 App. Div. 192, 85 N. Y. Supp. io89 (ist Dep't 1904);
see Matter of Roberts, 214 App. Div. 271, 275, 212 N. Y. Supp. 183, I88 (ist Dep't
1925). Compare with this the federal rule in Perry v. Rubber Tire Wheel Co., 138
Fed. 836 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1905). The dissenting opinion in the instant case at 708
cites the Roberts case as the source of the rule that the domestic court will not deter-
mine the competency of the evidence sought. But in that case the "rule" was dictum,
a quotation from the earlier Randall decision, in which the court determined that the
evidence sought was "not entirely irrelevant to the subject-matter of the action," though
it did not pass on the "strict legality and competency" of the evidence, leaving that to
the Ohio court when the commission was returned. A motion to compel testimony
was granted. Thus, it appears that a prior inquiry by the domestic court as to compe-
tency and relevancy is proper.
13. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 597.
x4. See Benckenstein v. Schott, 92 Ohio St. 29, 38, 11o N. E. 633, 635 (i915).
15. Instant case at 706.
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Restraint of Trade-Right of State to Sue for Treble Damages
Under Sherman Act-The State of Georgia, alleging that the defend-
ants had combined to fix prices and suppress competition in the sale of
asphalt to its State Highway Board in violation of the Sherman Act,
brought suit to recover treble damages under Section seven of that Act.,
Held (Justice Roberts dissenting), a state of the United States is a "per-
son" entitled to sue for treble damages under this section. State of Georgia
v. Evans, et al., io U. S. L. WEEK 4347 (U. S. 1942). .
It is well settled law that the United States alone can enforce the
criminal and equitable provisions of the Sherman Act,2 and that an indi-
vidual is limited to an action for treble damages under Section seven.s
A city as a "person" may sue for treble damages,4 but this civil remedy
is denied to the United States Government.5 Section eight provides that
the word "person" shall include corporations.8 However, since the Act
contains no further definition of "person", the question whether that term
includes a state would seem to depend upon judicial definition unfettered
by specific legislative limitation.7  The Court rejected the defendant's
contention that the decision in the Cooper case' holding that the United
States Government is not a "person" under Section seven, is conclusive
against all sovereign bodies.9 Whether or not the classes of "persons"
contemplated by the legislature in the statute includes a government body
must depend on the legislative background of the statute.'0 Since the basic
purpose of the Act is to prevent the detriment to consumers resulting from
non-competitive prices established by combinations in restraint of trade,
a consumer should not be left without a remedy under the Act merely
because that particular consumer is a state." The position of the ma-
jority is strengthened by considering that government contracts are usually
subjects of competitive bidding; if a government body has no remedy
against persons combining to fix prices for the commodities which the
government must purchase, the competitive bidding aspect of government
contracts becomes a nullity.' 2 The remedy available to state governments
I. 26 STAT. 2O9, 210 (1890), 15 U. S. C. A. § 15 (1941).
2. United States v. Patterson, 201 Fed. 697 (S. D. Ohio, 1912); Greer, Mills &
Co. v. Stoller, 77 Fed. I (C. C. W. D. Mo. 1896).
3. Union Pacific R. R. v. Frank, 226 Fed. 9o6 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915); Pidcock v.
Harrington, 64 Fed. 821 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. I894).
4. City of Atlanta v. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Co., 203 U. S. 39o (9o6).
5. United States v. Cooper Corporation, 312 U. S. 6oo (1940), 89 U. oF PA. L.
REv. 243, 29 CALIF. L. Rxv. 657, (1942) 40 MIcH. L. REv. 149.
6. "The word 'person', or 'persons', wherever used in sections 1-7 and 15 of this
act shall be deemed to include corporations and associations existing under or author-
ized by the laws of either the United States, the laws of any of the Territories, the laws
of any State, or the laws of any foreign country." 26 STAT. 220 (89o), 15 U. S. C. A.
§7 (194).
7. However, Mr. Justice Roberts, dissenting in the instant case, found in the inclu-
sion by Section 8 of corporations existing under or authorized by the laws of any state,
an exclusion, by inference, of the states themselves. Instant case at 4348.
8. 312 U. S. 6oo (1940).
9. Instant case at 4348.
io. Ibid.; Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360, 370 (1933). See also (1938) 86 U.
OF PA. L. Rnv. 436, for a collection of authorities on the general rules of statutory con-
struction.
II. Instant case at 4348. Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in the Cooper case, said:
"it is difficult . . . to believe that Congress did not intend to give equal protection
to all purchasers similarly injured . . . no language in the Act, nothing in its his-
tory . . . makes necessary the conclusion that Congress intended to discriminate.
. . . 312 U. S. 6oo, 615 (1940).
12. "By statute, government contracts, except in the case of public emergency,
must be made after public bidding. Sealed bids are required. The statutory procedure
is thus designed to insure the government the advantages of price competition among
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under the rule of the instant case provides a deterrent for such illegal
combinations in restraint of trade and furnishes a method of fully com-
pensating a state government for losses sustained through enforced buying
at non-competitive prices. 13
Taxation-Receipt by Sole Stockholder of Preferred Stock Divi-
dend on Common Shares Not Taxable as Income-Petitioner, sole
owner of the capital stock of a holding company with only common shares
outstanding, received a preferred stock dividend' but did not report it
as income in his tax return for 1936. Nevertheless an assessment was
made thereon and he now seeks to recover the amount paid. Held, for
petitioner. Receipt by sole stockholder of preferred stock dividend on
common shares not taxable as income. Dreyfuss v. Manning, 44 F. Supp.
383 (1942).
Eisner v. Macomber 2 was early interpreted as holding stock divi-
dends not taxable as income under the Sixteenth Amendment.3 Al-
though more recent decisions have compelled considerable modification
of that interpretation,' two tests of taxability,5 which have been utilized
to a greater or less degree in all decisions on this point, evolved from that
case. They are: (i) the severance test (in later cases expressed as
whether the stockholders have received something substantially different
from what they previously had), (2) whether the stockholders' pre-exist-
ing proportionate interest in the corporation had been changed. What
constitutes conformance with either of these tests and whether compliance
sellers. This purpose is wholly frustrated where the would-be sellers agree upon the
prices to be bid and submit identical bids pursuant to such agreement. For example,
recently in bids for a steel pipe contract where 59 bids were opened by the Navy De-
partment, each of 59 concerns was found to have bid $i6,ooi.82." 3. C. C. H. TRADE
REG. SERV. (8th ed. 1940) 1 17,013; see also TEMP. NAT. EcoN. CommITTEE, MONO.
No. i9, GOVERNMENT PURCHAsING-AN EcoNomIc COMMENTARY (1940). While this
quotation refers explicitly to federal government contracts, state and municipal gov-
ernment contracts are subject to similar statutory restrictions in all the states.
13. That it may sometimes be difficult for a state to prove the damages sustained
because of combinations by sellers to fix prices for products which the state must pur-
chase is no reason for denying the state the right to use this remedy. For a discussion
of the general problem of damages under this Act, see Donovan and Irvine, Proof of
Damages under the Anti-Trust Law (1940) 88 U. OF PA. L. Rxv. 511.
i. The dividends involved in this case are those in the corporation's own stock.
Dividends of a corporation in the stock of another corporation are taxable as income.
Peabody v. Eisner, 247 U. S. 347 (i18).
2. 252 U. S. i89 (1920). In that case it was held that a dividend of common stock
to common stockholders, when there was no preferred stock outstanding, was not in-
come.
3. As a result of that decision the Revenue Act of 1921, § 2oi (d) and subsequent
acts up to and including the 1934 Act stated briefly: "A stock dividend shall not be
subject to tax."
4. In Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U. S. 44i (1936), the Supreme Court held that
where there are two classes of stock outstanding and preferred stockholders receive a
dividend in common stock, they receive income which may be taxed under the Six-
teenth Amendment. As a result the 1936 Act and later law provide in effect that a
distribution made by a corporation to its shareholders in its stock is a taxable dividend
unless such distribution cannot be taxed under the Sixteenth Amendment.
In Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U. S. 238 (1937), the Court, considering a dividend
of preferred stock to common stockholders, held that Congress could have taxed that
stock dividend.
In Sprouse v. Commissioner, 1:22 F. (2d) 973 (C. C. A. 9th, 194), the Court re-
versed the Board of Tax Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings in
order to determine whether the proportionate interests of the stockholders changed
because of the distribution of non-voting stock to the holders of voting and non-voting
common stock.
5. Mr. Jacob Mertens, Jr., in Recent Income Tax Trends in Stock Dividend Cases
(1942) 28 CORN. L. Q. 449, 454, cites five tests for determining whether income has
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with both is necessary have been much debated questions. 6 The court in
the instant case held the' application of either test results in the conclusion
that the receipt of this stock dividend was not taxable as income. Obvi-
ously the stocker's proportional interest had not been changed since there
was but a single stockholder.7  But a contrary result can be reached on
these facts by employing a very technical application of the "different in-
terest" rule.8 However, to do so in this instance is to find a change of
interest in a mere change in the evidence of such interest. Undoubtedly
the preferred stock does set forth different conditions from the common,
but an analysis reveals that whatever inherent value there is in preferred
shares must be deducted from the common. In view of the possible result
of a strict application of "different interest" rule it is perhaps well for the
courts to exercise considerable hesitancy in applying that test broadly to
stock dividend cases. Certainly if it is applied, the gain should be meas-
ured as it is in exchange cases by the difference between the cost of prop-
erty previously owned and the value of property which one has after the
stock dividend.10 However, on the whole the use of the "change in pro-
portional interest" test would seem to produce the more desirable result.,1
been realized. However, in the course of the article it develops that the two stated
herein are the only important ones.
6. There are many ways in which the stockholders' pre-existing proportionate
interest in the corporation can be changed. If there is participating preferred stock
outstanding, a dividend of common stock to common stockholders would seem to be
taxable income, the common stockholder having gained a greater participation in
profits above the minimum required to meet the guaranteed return on the preferred.
If there is participating and voting preferred stock outstanding, a dividend of common
stock to the preferred stockholders results in a gain of larger share in voting, divi-
dend participating and liquidation participation. Likewise a dividend of preferred
stock to a preferred stockholder increases his share in the profits or in the proceeds of
liquidation before the common stockholders participate.
In Strassburger v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 124 F. (2d) 315 (C. C. A.
2d, 1941), where the facts were similar to those in the instant case, compliance with
both tests was not required. The finding that a "different interest" resulted was held
to be sufficient.
7. On the other hand, in Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U. S. 441 (1936) and Hel-
vermg v. Gowran, 302 U. S. 238 (1937) there were two classes of stock outstanding
when the dividend was declared; hence the stock dividend in each of those cases
changed the stockholders' proportionate interests in the net corporate assets.
8. That was done in Strassburger v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 124 F.
(2d) 315 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941), cited note 6 supra, which is squarely contra to the in-
stant case.
9. This test was really largely developed in connection with the so-called exchange
or reorganization cases. United States v. Phellis, 257 U. S. 156 (I921) ; Rockefeller
v. United States, 257 U. S. 176 (1921); Cullinan v. Walker, 262 U. S. 134 (1923);
Weiss v. Steam, 265 U. S. 242 (1924) ; Marr v. United States, 268 U. S. 536 (1925).
1o. This measure would appear more fair than that of the fair market value of the
new stock received without any offsetting cost
ii. The result reached in this case is approved in C. C. H. STA.NDARD FEn. TAX
SERVICE 1941, Vol. 2, p. 3o96, and by Jacob Mertens, Jr, both in LAw oF FED. INcoME
TAXATION 1939, Cum. Supp., p. 295 et seq., and in Recent Income Tax Trends in Stock
Dividend Cases (1942) 28 CoRN. L. Q. 449.
